Abstract. We introduce the definability strength of combinatorial principles. In terms of definability strength, a combinatorial principle is strong if solving a corresponding combinatorial problem could help in simplifying the definition of a definable set. We prove that some consequences of Ramsey's Theorem for colorings of pairs could help in simplifying the definitions of some ∆ 0 2 sets, while some others could not. We also investigate some consequences of Ramsey's Theorem for colorings of longer tuples. These results of definability strength have some interesting consequences in reverse mathematics, including strengthening of known theorems in a more uniform way and also new theorems.
Introduction
In early ages of reverse mathematics, people found that many classical theorems in ordinary mathematics, when formulated in second order arithmetic, are equivalent to certain subsystems of second order arithmetic over the Recursive Comprehension Axiom (RCA 0 ), in terms of their provability strength. The most prominent subsystems are the so-called big five: RCA 0 , WKL 0 , ACA 0 , ATR 0 and Π 1 1 -CA, with their provability strength growing strictly stronger from left to right. So the big five give us a nice ruler, against which the provability strength of many classical theorems can be precisely measured. But there are exceptions. One of these exceptions is the instance of Ramsey's Theorem for 2-colorings of pairs, denoted by RT 2 2 . From Jockusch [10] , we can see that every instance of Ramsey's Theorem is a consequence of ACA 0 , the instance for colorings of triples is equivalent to ACA 0 over RCA 0 , but RT 2 2 is not implied by WKL 0 ; later Seetapun [14] proved that RT 2 2 is strictly weaker than ACA 0 over RCA 0 . Since Seetapun's work, people have found many propositions in second order arithmetic related more or less to RT 2 2 whose provability strength cannot be precisely measured by the ruler. People started comparing the provability strength of these propositions to each other and have revealed a very complicated picture. For a general impression of this complicated picture, we refer the reader to the Reverse Mathematics Zoo (http://rmzoo.uconn.edu/) maintained by Dzhafarov.
Most propositions in the complicated picture are combinatorial principles and can be formulated as Π where ϕ is arithmetic. Given such Φ, each X represents an instance of the corresponding combinatorial problem, and each Y satisfying ϕ(X, Y ) a solution. A popular and fruitful approach to examine the provability strength of Φ is by analyzing its computability strength. If for each set W in a certain class of non-computable sets, there exists a computable Φ-instance X such that every solution Y to the instance X can code W in some effective way, then we may say that Φ has strong computability strength in some sense; otherwise, Φ is considered weak. By relativization, usually we can build an ω-model of a base system (e.g., RCA 0 ) and a Π 1 2 proposition Ψ with weak computability strength, which does not contain any solution to a computable instance of another Π 1 2 proposition Φ with strong computability strength. So we conclude that Ψ does not imply Φ over the base system. The analysis of computability strength is not limited to comparing propositions with different provability strength, but it can also help us comparing propositions that have equal provability strength, as shown in [4] .
In this paper, we introduce a new kind of analysis, based on what we call the definability strength. Roughly, if Φ is a Π 1 2 sentence then the definability strength of Φ is measured by whether solving a Φ-instance helps in simplifying certain definability problem. A formal definition is given in Definition 2.1. Here we mainly apply this analysis to Π 1 2 propositions in Ramsey theory and also related propositions studied in reverse mathematics.
As the analysis of computability strength, analyzing the definability strength of Π 1 2 propositions also leads to consequences in reverse mathematics. We shall present several results of this kind here. These new results introduce more chaos to the Reverse Mathematics Zoo. However, they also give us a rather clear classification of most animals in the Zoo by definability strength. Interestingly, the analysis of definability strength also yields new proofs of known reverse mathematics theorems, which were obtained by the analysis of computability strength. Though this new analysis sounds a little coaser than that of computability strength, it gives some new proofs in a more uniform way. For example, people have proved several theorems concerning the provability strength of the Ascending or Descending Sequence principle (ADS), and some of these proofs share little similarity. But through the analysis of definability strength we obtain new proofs which all depend on the definability strength of ADS. Moreover, as definability appears naturally in various areas of logic and the new analysis connects combinatorial principles to definability problems, we believe that this new analysis is interesting in its own right.
Below, we briefly introduce the remaining parts of this paper:
• In §2, we give a formal definition of the center concept of this paper and prove some general facts which will facilitate our concrete analysis.
• In §3, we study some computability notions and Π 1 2 propositions which are weak in terms of definability strength.
• In §4, we show that some other Π 1 2 propositions are strong in terms of definability strength.
• In §5, we conclude this paper with a summarization of the definability strength results, some consequences in reverse mathematics and a few remarks.
We finish this section with a few words on notation and background knowledge. If s and t are two finite sequences, then we write st for the concatenation of s and t. If x is a single symbol, then x is the finite sequence with only one symbol x. The length of a finite sequence s is denoted by |s|. If l < |s| then s ↾ l is the initial segment of s of length l. For X ⊆ ω, X ↾ l is interpreted as an initial segment of the characteristic function of X in the obvious way.
Recall that [X]
r for 0 < r < ω is the set of r-element subsets of X. We also write [X] ω for the set of countable subsets of X;
≤ω are interpreted naturally. If X ⊆ ω, then elements of [X] ≤ω are identified with strictly increasing sequences. We use σ, τ, . . . for elements of ω <ω . Under the above convention, we may perform both sequence operations and set operations on elements of [ω] <ω . For example, we can write στ for σ ∪ τ , if σ and τ are in [ω] <ω and max σ < min τ ; σ ⊆ τ if σ is a subset of τ ; and σ − τ = {x ∈ σ : x ∈ τ }. We extend this convention to infinite subsets of ω, so we write σX for σ ∪ X, if max σ < min X and X ∈ [ω]
≤ω . We fix a computable bijection · : ω <ω → ω and occasionally identify σ with σ . So we may write σ < τ for σ < τ , etc.
For two sets X and Y , we write X ⊆ * Y if X − Y is finite and X = * Y if X ⊆ * Y and Y ⊆ * X. When we work on Ramsey theory, we call a function as a coloring. For a positive integer c, a c-coloring is a coloring with range contained in c = {0, 1, . . . , c − 1}. A homogeneous set of a coloring f on [ω] n is a set H such that f is constant on [H] n . Ramsey's Theorem states that for every positive integers c and n > 1 every c-coloring of [ω] n admits an infinite homogeneous set. RT n c stands for the instance of Ramsey's Theorem for fixed n and c. Sometimes it is helpful to consider stable colorings: a coloring f :
n . It is widely understood that computable and recursive are synonymous and so are computability and recurion theory. Here we prefer computable and computability in most cases, since computability strength aligns better with its provability and definability counterparts. However, we prefer primitively recursive to primitively computable, as the former better indicates the definition both referring to.
For more notions in computability and reverse mathematics, we refer the reader to Soare [16] and Simpson [15] . We also need some knowledge in algorithmic randomness which can be found in Downey and Hirschfeldt [5] . Furthermore, we recommend a recent survey paper by Hirschfeldt [7] for a general picture of the reverse mathematics of Ramsey theory.
Preparations
Our center concept is formulated below. As Ξ-definitions relative to X are trivially Ξ relative to X ⊕ Y , usually we omit the adverb properly in the above definition and simply say that Y preserves Ξ-definitions, etc.
If Φ admits preservation of Ξ-definitions then solving Φ-instances does not simply a properly Ξ-definition. Thus we may classify Φ as a weak proposition. So the above definition captures our motivation in §1. In the remaining part of this section, we prove some propositions which will help us in proving preservation and nonpreservation results later.
The first proposition slightly simplies Definition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that n > 0. 
is of properly computably enumerable degree relative to X (n−1) . By relativizing a construction of Shore (see [16, VI.3.9] or [5, Theorem 8.21 .15]), there exists G ≤ T A ⊕ X (n−1) which is 1-generic relative to X (n−1) and thus n-generic relative to X. So G is properly ∆ X n+1 . But
Hence G is ∆ In the light of Proposition 2.2(4), people may suggest to introduce a notion like preservation of non-computable-enumerability which sounds stronger than preservation of ∆ 0 2 sets. However, preservation of non-computable-enumerability literally implies that every non-computably-enumerable set is non-computably-enumerable relative to Y . But a non-computable Y with such a property cannot be computably enumerable and thus only computable sets preserve non-computable-enumerability. On the other hand, preservation of the arithmetic hierarchy does not seem admitting an alternative like preservation of non-computable-enumerability.
Next we present a proposition that connects definability strength and computability strength. If ϕ is arithmetic and Φ = (∀X)(∃Y )ϕ(X, Y ) and if for every Z and X ≤ T Z and every countable sequence (A i : i < ω) of sets not computable in Z there exists Y such that ϕ(X, Y ) and A i ≤ T Z ⊕ Y for each i, then we say that Φ admits simultaneous avoidance of countably many cones. The last proposition of this section shows us how the analysis of definability strength leads to reverse mathematics consequences. If S is a subset of 2 ω and Ξ is among ∆ 0 n+1 , Π 0 n and Σ 0 n , then we write Ξ(S) for the set {A : (∃X ∈ S)(A ∈ Ξ X )}. We say that S preserves Ξ-definitions (relative to Z) if every properly Ξ (relative to Z) set is properly Ξ(S) (Ξ(Z ⊕S) where Z ⊕S = {Z ⊕X : X ∈ S}), and S preserves the arithmetic hierarchy (relative to Z) if S preserves Ξ-definitions (relative to Z) for every Ξ among ∆ 
Conversely, if RCA 0 + i Φ i ⊢ Ψ and Ψ does not admit preservation of Ξ-definitions, then some Φ i does not admit preservation of Ξ-definitions either.
For an arbitrary Z, if we have an ω-model (ω, S) as described then for every Φ i and every X ≤ T Z we can pick Y ∈ S such that ϕ i (X, Y ) holds and Y preserves Ξ-definitions relative to Z. So every Φ i admits preservation of Ξ-definitions.
Conversely, suppose that every Φ i admits preservation of Ξ-definitions, then we can build a sequence ((ω, S n ) : n < ω) such that
• each S n is of the form {Y : Y ≤ T X n } for some X n and X 0 = Z; • X n ≤ T X n+1 and X n+1 preserves Ξ-definitions relative to X n ; • for each i and X ∈ S n there exist m > n and Y ∈ S m such that ϕ i (X, Y ).
(2) Suppose that Ψ = (∀X)(∃Y )ψ(X, Y ) does not admit preservation of Ξ-definitions. Then there exist Z and X ≤ T Z such that if ψ(X, Y ) then Y does not preserve Ξ-definitions relative to Z. Hence any (ω, S) |= RCA 0 +Ψ containing Z is a desired model.
(3) follows directly from (1) and (2).
Preservations
Recall that our main purpose is to analyze the definability strength of propositions in Ramsey theory. Here we show that some Π 1 2 propositions are weak in terms of definability strength. We also show that some computability notions related to the reverse mathematics of Ramsey theory are also weak.
3.1. Cohen genericity and randomness. It is not surprising that both Cohen generic and random reals are weak in terms of definability strength.
Proposition 3.1. If G is sufficiently Cohen generic relative to X then G preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X.
Proof. We use for Cohen forcing. Note that {σ ∈ 2 <ω : σ ϕ} is Σ X n if ϕ is Σ X n . Suppose that A ∈ Σ X n and ϕ is Σ X n where n > 0. We claim that the following set is meager:
By Proposition 2.2, G preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X.
If we carefully examine the above proof then we can obtain the following finer result. Recall that G is weakly n-generic relative to X if G meets every Σ 
By the proof of Proposition 3.1, the following set is dense and Σ
We apply Proposition 3.1 to a Π For the next preservation result concerning random reals, we identify R with Cantor space and denote Lebesgue measure by m. Recall that a real is sufficiently random if it avoids sufficiently many Lebesgue null sets.
Proposition 3.4. If R is sufficiently random relative to X then R preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X.
Proof. Suppose that A ∈ Σ X n and ϕ is Σ X n where n > 0. We claim that the following set is Lebesgue null:
Otherwise there exists σ ∈ 2 <ω such that
and A is Σ Similarly, if we examine the effectiveness of the above proof then we can obtain the finer preservation result below. Recall that a real is weakly n-random if it avoids every Π 0 n null set (see [5, §7.2] ). Corollary 3.5. If R is weakly (n + 1)-random relative to X then R simultaneously preserves Σ 0 n -, Π 0 n -and ∆ 0 n -definitions relative to X. Proof. Fix R being weakly (n+1)-random relative to X. As in the proof of Corollary 3.2, it suffices to show that ∆
and ϕ be Σ X n . By the proof of Proposition 3.4, the following set is Π X n+1 and null:
So R ∈ S and A = {i : ϕ(R, i)}.
From the short proofs above, the reader may have found that the definability of forcing is a key to preservation.
3.2. Weak König's Lemma. We devote this section to the proof of the following preservation theorem for WKL 0 . Theorem 3.6. WKL 0 admits preservation of the arithmetic hierarchy.
As in the last subsection, we prove the above theorem by proving the definability of a forcing. We fix an X and an X-computable infinite binary tree T 0 and need to find G ∈ [T 0 ] preserving the arithmetic hierarchy relative to X. As our proof will be relativizable, we may assume that X is computable. To build G, we build a sequence of computable trees (T i : i < ω) such that each T i+1 is a subtree of T i , and then obtain G as a member of i [T i ]. We introduce a forcing notion and require that each T i is a condition forcing a fragment of the preservation requirement.
Definition 3.7. If T is a computable subtree of 2 <ω , then a primitively recursive subtree S of T is a tree of the form
where R is a primitively recursive subset of 2 <ω . Let Pr(T ) denote the set of all primitively recursive subtrees of T . Note that a tree in Pr(T ) could be finite.
Let P be the set of infinite primitively recursive subtrees of T 0 . A tree in P is a forcing condition. For S and T in P, S ≤ T if and only if S is a subtree of T .
The following lemma shows that moving from computable trees to primitively recursive trees costs nothing as long as we concern only the set of infinite paths of a tree. Proof. Fix a computable tree S. Let ψ(σ; x) be a Σ 0 0 formula such that S = {σ : (∀ x)¬ψ(σ, x)}.
is a primitively recursive tree and [S] = [T ].
So we assume that every computable tree appearing below is primitively recursive. But the main advantage of using primitively recursive trees is that we can better control the complexity.
Lemma 3.9. Suppose that T ∈ P. Then Pr(T ) − P can be identified with a Σ 0 1 set.
Proof. Fix a computable enumeration (S n : n < ω) of Pr(T ).
So Pr(T ) − P can be identified with the Σ 0 1 set {n : S n is finite}.
We define the forcing relation below. Our forcing language is the first order language of arithmetic augmented by a unary predicate G.
and
(2) Suppose that ϕ(G) is not of the above forms.
where S ψ(G) means ¬(S ψ(G)).
Definition 3.10 appears slightly different from usual forcing definitions. The difference is introduced for definability purpose. But the next two lemmata show that this difference is superficial.
Lemma 3.11. For every arithmetic formula ϕ, the following set is dense {T ∈ P : T ϕ or T ¬ϕ}.
Proof. Fix a formula ϕ and a tree T ∈ P.
Suppose that ϕ is of the form (∃ x)ψ and ψ is Σ
Clearly S is a computable subtree of T . If S is infinite then S ¬ϕ. If S is finite then pick σ ∈ T − S such that the following set is infinite: R = {τ ∈ T : τ is comparable with σ}.
Then R ∈ P and R ≤ T . As σ ∈ T − S, ψ(σ; x)[ n] for some n with max n < |σ|. So R ϕ.
If ϕ is not Σ 0 1 then the density follows from clause (2c) of Definition 3.10.
If F is a sufficiently P-generic filter then T ∈F [T ] contains exactly one real G. Conversely, from each real H we can define an induced filter F (H) over P as the trees in P having H as an infinite path. Moreover, if G is the real defined from a generic filter F as above then F = F (G). So we may say that a real G is sufficiently generic.
Lemma 3.12. Suppose that G is a sufficiently P-generic. Then for each n > 0 and each
and T ϕ. Conversely, if T ∈ F (G) and T ϕ then there exist n and σ ∈ 2 n ∩ T such that σ ≺ G and ψ(σ; x)[ m] for some m. Hence ϕ(G) holds. Suppose that ψ is Σ 0 0 and ϕ = ¬(∃ x)ψ. If ϕ(G) holds then let T = {σ ∈ T 0 : (∀ n)(max n < |σ| → ¬ψ(σ; x)[ n])}.
Then T ∈ F (G) and T ϕ. Conversely, if T ∈ F (G) and T ϕ then ¬ψ(σ; x)[ n] for every σ ≺ G and every n with max n < |σ|. Hence ϕ(G) holds.
Suppose that ϕ is not in above forms. If ϕ is of the form (∃x)ψ then
where the second equivalence is by the induction hypothesis and the last is by clause (2a) of Definition 3.10.
If ϕ is of the form ψ ∧ θ then
where the second equivalence is by the induction hypothesis and the last is by taking R = S ∩ T and clause (2b) of Definition 2.1. If ϕ is of the form ¬ψ then
By Lemma 3.11 and the genericity of G, the last statement above is equivalent to the following T ¬ψ for some T ∈ F (G).
Next we show that our forcing relation is definable.
Proof. The case where n = 1 follows from clause (1) of Definition 3.10.
Assume that n > 1. For ϕ(G) ∈ Σ 0 n , the lemma follows from the induction hypothesis and Definition 3.10(2). Suppose that
By the induction hypothesis, S ψ(G) is a Π 0 n predicate of S. So the last statement above is a Π 0 n predicate of T as n > 1 and Pr(T ) − P is Σ 0 1 by Lemma 3.9. Now we can show that the definability strength of P-generic reals is weak.
n ) where n > 0, then the set of T ∈ P satisfying the following property is dense:
Proof. Fix T ∈ P. We need to find S ≤ T with
Then W ∈ Σ 0 1 and thus W = A. Fix n ∈ W △ A. If n ∈ W − A, then let σ ∈ T be such that ϕ(σ, n) and the following subtree of T is infinite: S = {τ ∈ T : τ is comparable with σ}.
By Lemma 3.8, we may assume that S ∈ P. Then S ¬ϕ(G, x) [n] .
Assume that n > 1,
By Lemmata 3.9 and 3.13, U ∈ Σ 0 n and thus
Finally, assume that n > 0, A ∈ Π 0 n and ϕ(G, x) ∈ Π 0 n . Then ω − A ∈ Σ 0 n and ϕ(G, x) is of the form ¬ψ(G, x) for some ψ(G, x) ∈ Σ 0 n . By the proof above, the following set is dense
So the above set is contained in the following set
This proves the lemma for the last case. Theorem 3.6 follows from Lemmata 3.12 and 3.14.
3.3. COH. Recall that a cohesive set for a sequence (A n : n < ω) is an infinite set C such that either C ⊆ * A n or C ⊆ * ω − A n for each n. COH is the assertion that every sequence of sets has a cohesive set. Cholak et alia [2] introduced COH and proved that it is a consequence of RCA 0 + RT 2 2 . Here we prove that COH enjoys a preservation property. <ω × [ω] ω such that max σ < min X. We identify a Mathias condition (σ, X) with the set below: for all G ∈ (τ, Y ).
Then W is Σ Z 1 and thus W = A. Fix n ∈ W △ A. If n ∈ W − A then let G ∈ (σ, X) and l > |σ| be such that n ∈ W Z↾l⊕G↾l e and let (τ, Y ) = (G ↾ l, X ∩ (max τ, ∞)). If n ∈ A − W then let (τ, Y ) = (σ, X).
3.4.
2 → 2 in the following way:
A set X is transitive for a tournament R if R ∩ X 2 is a transitive relation. Erdős-Moser Principle (EM) is the assertion that every tournament admits an infinite transitive set. Below we prove the above lemma. Fix Z, R and (A i : i < ω) as in the statement of Lemma 3.18. Without loss of generality, assume that Z is computable. We build an infinite R-transitive G as desired by Mathias forcing.
Let f : ω → 2 be as follows:
By the stability of R, f is total. A Mathias condition (σ, X) is acceptable, if and only if (a1) for all x ∈ σ and y ∈ X,
(a2) σ y is R-transitive for all y ∈ X.
To build G, we build a descending sequence of acceptable Mathias conditions. Note that, if (σ, X) is R-acceptable then
In general, if g is an arbitrary 2-coloring of ω, then we say that R and g are compatible on
<ω is such that στ is R-transitive and R and f are compatible on στ , then (στ, X∩(n, ∞)) is acceptable for sufficiently large n.
Proof. Let τ be as above. As στ is R-transitive, we can list elements of στ in R-ascending order: a 0 Ra 1 R . . . Ra k−1 , where k = |στ |. Let X 0 = {x ∈ X : x > max τ ∧ xRa 0 },
By the stability of R and that R and f are compatible on στ , X i = * X for a unique i ≤ k. So, στ x is R-transitive for all x ∈ X i . By the definition of X i , for each a ∈ στ , if f (a) = 0 then aRx for all x ∈ X i , otherwise f (a) = 1 and xRa for all x ∈ X i . Hence, (στ, X i ) is acceptable.
So, if we can find sequences satisfying the condition of the above lemma then we can extend acceptable conditions. Lemma 3.20. Each acceptable (σ, X) can be extended to an acceptable (τ, Y ) such that |σ| < |τ | and Y = * X.
Proof. Let x = min X. By the remark preceding Lemma 3.19, R and f are compatible on σ x . So, the lemma follows from Lemma 3.19.
The following density lemma is the key of the proof.
Lemma 3.21. Let (σ, X) be acceptable and (A i : i < ω) be a sequence of sets such that A i ∈ Σ X 1 for all i. Then for every e and every k there exists an acceptable
Proof. Let F be the set of g : ω → 2 such that R and g are compatible on σ x for all x ∈ X. Then F can be identified with a Π X 1 class in Cantor space and f ∈ F . Let W be the set of n such that for every g ∈ F there exists ξ ∈ [X] <ω satisfying σξ is R-transitive ∧ R and g are compatible on σξ ∧ n ∈ W σξ e . By the compactness of F , W ∈ Σ X 1 and thus W = A k . Fix n ∈ W △ A k . Case 1. n ∈ W − A k . By the definition of W and that f ∈ F , we can pick ξ ∈ [X] <ω such that σξ is R-transitive, R and f are compatible on σξ and n ∈ W σξ e . Apply Lemma 3.19 to (σ, X) and ξ, we can obtain a desired extension (τ, Y ) with τ = σξ and Y = * X. Case 2. n ∈ A k − W . Let G be the set of g ∈ F such that (σξ is R-transitive ∧ R and g are compatible on σξ) → n ∈ W σξ e for all ξ ∈ [X] <ω . By the preservation property of WKL 0 (Theorem 3.6), we can pick g ∈ G such that
for all i.
Claim 3.22. If ξ ∈ [Y ]
<ω then R and g are compatible on σξ.
Proof. It suffices to show that R and g are compatible on arbitrary (a, b) ∈ [σξ] 2 . Note that a < b. If a ∈ σ, then R and g are compatible on ab as g ∈ F . If a and b are both in ξ, then g(a) = g(b) and thus R and g are compatible on ab as well.
Hence, if ξ ∈ [Y ]
<ω and σξ is R-transitive then n ∈ W σξ e , by the choice of g. So, (σ, Y ) is a desired extension. Proof. It suffices to show that for every fixed B = (B n : n < ω) with no B n being Σ Z 2 there exists an A-cohesive G such that no B n is Σ Z⊕G 2 either. For simplification, we assume that Z = ∅ and the reader can find that the proof below is relativizable.
We build an infinite binary tree T and a map f :
• f is strictly increasing, i.e., if µ is a proper initial segment of ν ∈ T then f (µ) is a proper initial segment of f (ν), and
Then we can take G = f (P ) = m f (P ↾ m) for any P ∈ [T ]. We use multiple Mathias conditions of the form ((σ µ : µ ∈ I), X) where X is low (so non-Σ 0 2 sets are exactly non-Σ X 2 sets), and build a sequence (p n : n < ω) of decreasing conditions such that
• each p n = ((σ n,µ : µ ∈ I n ), X n ) and I 0 = {∅}, σ 0,∅ = ∅ and X 0 = ω, • I n = I n+1 and if µ ∈ I n then either µ ∈ I n+1 or both µ 0 and µ 1 are in I n+1 , and • if µ ∈ I n+1 − I n then σ n,µ − is a proper initial segment of σ n+1,µ where µ − = µ ↾ (|µ| − 1).
So T = n I n is an infinite binary tree and f : µ → σ n,µ where n = |µ| is a strictly increasing map from T to [ω] <ω . Below we build the desired (p n : n < ω). By s-m-n theorem, we fix a computable function s such that for any C a number n is in the e-th Σ C 2 set if and only if Φ s(e,n) (C) is partial where Φ i is the i-th oracle Turing machine. For each µ ∈ 2 <ω , let
Claim 3.26. Suppose that p = ((σ µ : µ ∈ I), X) is ( e µ : µ ∈ I)-large and X is low. Then for every n and e there exist q = ((τ ν : ν ∈ J), Y ) and ( d ν : ν ∈ J) such that (1) q is a ( d ν : ν ∈ J)-large extension of p and Y is low; (2) J = I and if µ ∈ I then either µ ∈ J or both µ 0 and µ 1 are in J; (3) if ν ∈ J extends µ ∈ I then τ ν − σ µ ∈ X ∩ A µ ; (4) if ν ∈ I ∩ J then d ν = e ν and for every G ∈ (σ ν , X ∩ A µ ) there exists i ∈ e ν with Φ i (G) partial;
for all i ∈ e ν − , and for some m and j = s(e, m) either m ∈ B n and d ν = e ν − j or m ∈ B n and d ν = e ν − and Φ j (G) is partial for each G ∈ (τ ν , Y ).
Here we assume that dom Φ i (σ) = {0, 1, . . . , m − 1} = m for σ ∈ [ω] <ω . From the first clause of (5), if p is ( e µ : µ ∈ I)-large and P ∈ [T ] extends µ ∈ I then we intend to have Φ i (f (P )) total for every e ∈ e µ , while by the last part of (5) if p is extended to q and j = s(e, m) ∈ d ν then p forces Φ j (f (P )) being partial for P extending ν. So (5) ensures that each B n is not Σ 0 2 relative to f (P ) for P ∈ [T ]. That T is infinite is guaranteed by (2) and that f (P ) is A-cohesive for each P ∈ [T ] by (3) .
<ω be such that
Let S be the set of µ ∈ I with ρ µ defined, and let J be the set of ν ∈ 2 <ω such that either ν ∈ I − S or ν − ∈ S. Recall that as p is ( e µ : µ ∈ I)-large we intend to force the totality of Φ i (G) for every i ∈ e µ and sufficiently generic G ∈ (σ µ , X ∩ A µ ). But if µ ∈ I − S then our intention fails for (σ µ , X ∩ A µ ). Nevertheless, by [18, Lemma 3.8(1)], S = ∅ and (2) of the claim holds.
We build a finite descending sequence of extensions q k of p and define q as the least of this sequence. Firstly we define q 0 . For each ν ∈ J, if ν ∈ I then let
and denote the resulted sequence by ( c k,m,ν : ν ∈ J). Let W = {m : q k is small for ( c k,m,ν : ν ∈ J)}. 
. Replace τ k,ν k and Y k in q k by τ k,ν k ξ and X i respectively and denote the resulted condition by
Finally, let q = q k and ( d ν : ν ∈ J) = ( d k,ν : ν ∈ J) for k = |J − I|. By the construction above, q and ( d ν : ν ∈ J) are as desired.
Recall that I 0 = {∅}. Let e 0,∅ = ∅. For convenient, all conditions are considered ( e 0,µ : µ ∈ I 0 )-large. With the above claim, we can define (p n : n < ω) and ( e n,µ : µ ∈ I n ) such that
• p 0 is already defined before Claim 3.26;
• p n+1 ≤ * M p n and p n is ( e n,µ : µ ∈ I n )-large; • I n ⊆ I n+1 and if µ ∈ I n − I n+1 then both µ 0 and µ 1 are in I n+1 ;
• If ν ∈ I n+1 extends µ ∈ I n then σ n+1,ν − σ n,µ ∈ A µ and dom Φ i (σ n+1,ν ) > dom Φ i (σ n,µ ) for all i ∈ e n,µ ; • For each i and e, there exist m and n such that for every µ ∈ I n+1 − I n exactly one of the followings holds: (a) m ∈ B i , s(e, m) ∈ e n+1,µ and Φ s(e,m) (G) is partial for all G ∈ (σ n+1,µ , X n+1 ), (b) m ∈ B i and s(e, m) ∈ e n+1,µ . So T = n I n is an infinite binary tree and f : µ → σ n,µ where n = |µ| maps T to [ω] <ω in a strictly increasing manner. For each P ∈ [T ], f (P ) is A-cohesive. For e and i, let m and n witness the last bullet point above and let U be the e-th Σ 2 → ω is 2-bounded, stable and Z ′ -computable then there exists an infinite f -rainbow preserving ∆ 0 3 -definitions relative to Z. Proof. We present a relativizable proof for Z = ∅. By Proposition 3.4, sufficiently random sets preserve the arithmetic hierarchy, and by [18, Lemma 4.3] each sufficiently random set computes an infinite
2 with distinct v and y. So by replacing ω with some Y as above if necessary, we may assume that f (u, v) = f (x, y) for all (u, v) and (x, y) with distinct v and y. Moreover, as in [18, §4.1], we can assume that f (x, y) = w, y where w = min{v : f (v, y) = f (x, y)}.
We construct an infinite f -rainbow G preserving ∆ (1) We work with large conditions (σ, X, h) which are low (i.e., X ⊕ h is low); (2) Observe that it is a Σ 0 2 question whether a large condition p = (σ, X, h) passes an e-test at y (defined after the proof of [18, Lemma 4.16] ), if p is low; (3) By s-m-n theorem, we fix a computable function s such that for any C a number n is in the e-th Σ C 2 set if and only if Φ s(e,n) (C) is partial where Φ i is the i-th oracle Turing machine; (4) So for a given condition p and an index e, the following set is Σ we have Φ s(e,y) (G) total for G being sufficiently generic with respect to large conditions, thus y is not in the e-th Σ G 2 set; (7) If y ∈ W − A then p passes the s(e, y)-test at some x and by [18, Lemma 4 .17] we can extend p to q which forces Φ s(e,y) (G; x) ↑ for G sufficiently generic with respect to large conditions and thus y is in the e-th Σ <ω with σ where · is a fixed computable bijection mapping [ω] <ω onto ω. Fix Z and a Z-computable 2-bounded coloring f : [ω] 3 → ω. By passing to an infinite f -computable subset if necessary, we assume that f (σ x ) = f (τ y ) for all
3 with distinct x and y. As in the proof of Lemma 3.25, we may assume that
2 ) be such that
2 . Then A ≤ T f . By Corollary 3.29 below and that RCA 0 + RT 2 2 ⊢ COH, let C be an A-cohesive set preserving ∆ 2 → ω be such that
By the cohesiveness of C, g is a well-defined total function. We may assume that g(x, y) = min{ i, j :
′ . As f is 2-bounded, g is 2-bounded as well. Let B = (B n,x : n < ω, x ∈ C) be such that
′ and h is 2-bounded and stable. Apply Lemma 3.27, we get an infinite h-rainbow H which is a subset of D and preserves ∆ 
So G preserves ∆ 0 3 -definitions relative to Z.
3.6. More preservations. We have seen some preservation results that need substantial proofs. Here we list a few that follow easily from the above preservation results. Firstly, let us recall some additional notation and consequences of Ramsey's Theorem:
• We denote (∀c < ∞) RT n c by RT n and (∀n < ∞) RT n by RT.
• An apparently weaker consequence of RT n is the so-called Achromatic Ramsey Theorem (ART n <∞,d ): for every finite coloring f of [ω] n there exists an infinite subset H such that f ( [H] n ) contains at most d many colors.
• For a coloring f : [ω] n → ω, a free set is a set
The Free Set Theorem (FS) asserts that every f : [ω] n → ω for finite n admits an infinite free set, and the Thin Set Theorem (TS) asserts that every f : [ω] n → ω for finite n admits an infinite thin set. Over RCA 0 , RT implies FS and FS implies TS ( [1] ). [19] . By Jockusch [10] , there exists a computable f : [ω] 3 → 2 such that every infinite f -homogeneous set computes the halting problem. Hence RT : n > 0}. Proof. By Proposition 2.4, it suffices to prove the corollary for Φ being RT 2 . Let Z be fixed and f be a finite coloring of pairs computable in Z. By Theorem 3.6, let P be such that P is PA over Z ′ and P preserves the arithmetic hierarchy relative to Z ′ . By relativizing the argument in [2, §4], we can obtain an infinite f -homogeneous set H with (Z ⊕ H) 
Non-preservations
In the last section, we have learned some examples in Ramsey theory and computability that are weak in terms of definability strength. Here we present two Π [8] proved that SADS is strictly weaker than ADS and ADS is strictly weaker than RT Proof. By Harizanov [6] , we can take a computable stable linear order < L such that both the ω-part U = {i : ( For n > 2, by relativizating the induction hypothesis we fix a ∅ ′ -computablē f : [ω] n−1 → ω such that
n−2 , • if i < n − 1 is positive and X is an infinitef -thin set then there exists
Apply Lemma 4.4 to get f and (B i : i < ω) corresponding tof and n − 1. Suppose that i < n is positive and X is an infinite f -thin set.
To prove Lemma 4.4, we build several objects:
(1) A computable function f : [ω] n+1 → ω as required by the lemma. Let • if x ∈ B i then x ξ ∈ U i for all ξ ∈ A i with min ξ sufficiently large, and • if x ∈ B i and x ξ ∈ U i then ξ ∈ A i . We guarantee that lim s f (ξ, s) exists by ensuring that f (ξ, s) changes at most finitely often. We apply the same strategy to achieve the existence of lim s g(i, x, s). To achieve lim x lim y f (σ, x, y) = lim xf (σ, x) for n > 1 and σ ∈ [ω] n−1 , we fix a computable approximation (f s : s < ω) off and ensure that f (σ, x, s) =f s (σ, x) for x and s sufficiently large.
To make B i ∈ Σ 0 1 , we employ a finite injury argument to satisfy the following requirements:
R i,j : B i = W j . We follow the Friedberg-Muchnik construction to meet a single R i,j : we pick a witness for R i,j , say b, and put it in B i by defining g(i, b, s) = 1. If b ∈ W j,t at stage t > s then we remove b from B i by defining g(i, b, t) = 0.
To meet the first part of condition (3) above, at each stage s we enumerate b ξ in U i,s if b < min ξ ≤ max ξ < s, g(i, b, s) = 1 and f (ξ, s) = i. However, this action may cause some problem for the second part of condition (3), since later b could be removed from B i for the sake of some R i,j . To work around this problem, if we remove b from B i at stage t > s then we put ξ in A i by defining f (ξ, t ′ ) = i for all t ′ ≥ t. Note that at each stage we only enumerate a finite part of U i . So the above action defining f (ξ, t) affects at most finitely many ξ. Thus, if n > 1 and
n−1 then this action causes lim y f (σ, x, y) =f (σ, x) for only finitely many x. We initialize all R i ′ ,j ′ with lower priorities, so that eventually they will have witnesses greater than min σ. Thus at later stages R i ′ ,j ′ with lower priority will not require lim y f (σ,
The construction.
Recall that we fix a computable approximation (f s : s < ω) off . At stage s, if s > 0 then we assume that:
• f is defined on [s] n+1 ; • g(i, x, r) is defined for all (i, x) and r < s and if g(i, x, s − 1) = 1 then both i and x are less than s; • each U i,s−1 is finite. The construction at stage s consists of three parts. (i) We take care of R i,j 's here. A requirement R i,j requires attention if either of the following conditions holds:
• R i,j does not have a witness defined;
• R i,j has a witness (say b) defined and g(i, b, s − 1) = W j,s (b) = 1. Pick the least i, j with R i,j requiring attention and say that R i,j receives attention.
Suppose that R i,j does not have a witness. Perform the following actions:
• let s be its witness and let g(i, s, s) = 1;
where b is the witness of R i ′ ,j ′ ;
• proceed to (ii). Suppose that R i,j has a witness b defined. Perform the following actions:
• let g(i, b, s) = 0;
• for each i ′ , j ′ < i, j and the witness b
• for each i ′ , j ′ > i, j and the witness b ′ of R i ′ ,j ′ , let g(i ′ , b ′ , s) = 1 and let the witness of R i ′ ,j ′ be undefined. In other words, R i ′ ,j ′ is initialized and it will not have a witness defined until it receives attention again.
(ii) We define f and g.
• If s = 0 then let g(i, x, s) = 0 for all i and x; otherwise, let g(i, x, s) = g(i, x, s − 1) for each (i, x) such that g(i, x, s) is not defined in (i).
• If ξ ∈ [s]
n and b ξ ∈ U i,s−1 for an active witness b of some R i,j and if g(i, b, s) = 0, then let f (ξ, s) = i; otherwise let f (ξ, s) =f s (ξ).
(iii) We define U i,s by U i,s = U i,s−1 ∪ { x ξ : x < min ξ ≤ max ξ < s, g(i, x, s) = 1, f (ξ, s) = i}.
This ends the construction at stage s.
The verification.
Lemma 4.5. Each R i,j receives attention finitely often and is satisfied.
Note that in this lemma B i is to be understood as a Σ 0 2 set. Proof. We prove by induction on i, j . Fix i, j and assume that all R i ′ ,j ′ 's with i ′ , j ′ < i, j stop receiving attention after stage s 0 . We may assume that R i,j receives attention and has its witness x = s 0 defined at stage s 0 . As no R i ′ ,j ′ with i ′ , j ′ < i, j receives attention after stage s 0 , R i,j has its witness b = s 0 at all later stages.
By ′ < min ξ. It follows that at stage s the above R i,j is unique. Hence f is well-defined. The construction guarantees that f is computable.
To prove the existence of lim s f (ξ, s), pick a stage s such that no R i,j with a witness less than min ξ receives attention after stage s. At every stage t > s, either there exists exactly one fixed R i,j with an active witness b such that b ξ ∈ U i,t , or there is no such R i,j . In the former case lim s f (ξ, s) = i and in the latter lim s f (ξ, s) = lim sfs (ξ) =f (ξ).
Suppose that n > 1, σ ∈ [ω] n−1 and f (σ, x, s 1 ) =f s1 (σ, x). Then there is exactly one R i,j with an active witness b such that b σ x ∈ U i,s1−1 and g(i, b, s 1 ) = 0. Let s 0 ≤ s 1 be the stage such that g(i, b, s 0 − 1) = 1 and g(i, b, s 0 ) = 0 and b σ x ∈ U i,s0−1 . Then R i,j receives attention and all R i ′ ,j ′ with i ′ , j ′ > i, j are initialized at stage s 0 . So at any stage t > s 0 , if i ′ , j ′ > i, j and R i ′ ,j ′ has an active witness b ′ then b ′ > max σ and thus there exists no b ′ σ x ′ ∈ U i ′ ,t . It follows that lim s f (σ, x, s) =f (σ, x) for at most finitely many x. As lim xf (σ, x) exists, lim x lim s f (σ, x, s) = lim xf (σ, x). Lemma 4.7. g is computable and stable.
Proof. By the construction, g(i, x, s − 1) = g(i, x, s) happens only if at stage s some R i,j with an active witness b ≤ x receives attention. But there are at most finitely many R i,j 's having witnesses not greater than x. So we can pick a stage t such that no R i,j with an active witness b ≤ x receives attention after stage t. Then g(i, x, t) = lim s g(i, x, s).
Recall that A i = {ξ : lim s f (ξ, s) = i}. ). So it is natural to conjecture that these two preservations can be combined for both COH and EM.
Conjecture 5.3. Both COH and EM admit preservation of the arithmetic hierarchy.
